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Abstract
Reputation systems have become increasingly popular in virtual communities as a way to record and
communicate the reputation information of the members. However, different reputation systems use different
presentation formats and their effects on decisions in terms of evaluating positive and negative ratings remain
unclear. A controlled experiment is proposed using the preference ladder procedure to elicit subjective
preferences in three commonly used presentation formats. One format presents the negative and positive
ratings side by side; one presents the information as a percentage of total ratings that are positive; the third
presents the difference between the positive and negative ratings, the format used by eBay. Results of the
preliminary data analysis suggest that people weigh the positive and negative information to different extents
in the three formats.  Presenting reputation in the difference format tends to make a person weigh the negative
information less, making the person more forgivable.  The finding is possibly due to the salience of the negative
ratings in the various presentations.
Keywords:  Information presentation, reputation systems, trust, virtual communities
Introduction
The Internet has provided a global virtual community that enables individuals to interact and establish relationships with other
individuals independent of location. However, individual-to-individual relationships in virtual community often involve higher
uncertainty, to some extent due to the loss of social cues over the communication medium, and therefore require higher trust
(Olson and Olson 2000).  As a Peter Steiner’s famous cartoon in The New Yorker (July 5, 1993, p. 61) illustrates, “On the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog.”
Research has told us that “trust needs touch” (Olson and Olson 2000). In the physical community, trust can be built by repeated
face-to-face interactions. In the virtual community, face-to-face interactions are almost impossible, and repeated interactions are
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often limited to business-to-consumer markets. For consumer-to-consumer markets such as eBay, buyers are unlikely to have
repeated transactions with the same sellers. As a result, effective communication of trustworthiness is needed to sustain virtual
markets.
A commonly used mechanism for communicating trustworthiness is reputation. Reputation provides information on the person's
likelihood of carrying out certain behaviors in the future (Whitmeyer 2000; Wilson 1985).  In the physical community, reputation
is often communicated informally through repeated interactions or word of mouth such as gossiping. While word-of-mouth may
be effective in small, close communities, it becomes ineffective as the community grows. As a result, documenting reputation
formally using a reputation system has become increasingly popular in online communities. Members can rely on information
provided by other members to reduce the risk (Lee 1998).
Reputation systems can be generally categorized based on the mechanism under which reputation information is collected. One
mechanism, which is more common in business-to-consumer markets such as TRUSTe and the Better Business Bureau, is based
on reviews by reputable authorities. Another mechanism, which is more common in commerce-to-commerce markets, is based
on peer reviews.  Examples of peer-reviewed reputation systems include Download.com and eBay Feedback Forum. Online
reputation systems are emerging as an important mechanism for quality signaling and as a quality control mechanism in online
trading communities (Dellarocas 2001; Kollock 1999; Resnick et al. 2002).  Reputation systems are generally believed to be
effective in building trust among the potential trading parties in an online market (Walden 2000), and to improve the effectiveness
of the market (Adler 2001).
Different reputation systems present reputation information differently. For example, eBay Feedback Forum is a binary rating
system under which each user buyer or seller can be rated as positive (+1) or negative (-1). The overall rating is represented as
the difference between the number of positive ratings and negative ratings.  Download.com uses a similar binary rating system
under which software can be rated as “thumbs up” (good) or “thumbs down” (bad). However, the overall rating of the software
is represented as the percentage of ratings that are positive. While the two presentation formats are equivalent in terms of the
content communicated, it is unclear whether people receive and use the information the same way under different formats. We
believe that the usefulness of a reputation system depends not only on the quality of the information captured by the system but
also the quality of the information presented to the user. By understanding how users interpret the underlying information provided
by a reputation system, system designers can improve the presentation of information so that it can be easily and accurately
interpreted by the users. Therefore, this study investigates how different presentation of the same piece of information regarding
one’s reputation may be evaluated differently under different formats.
Literature Review
Reputation information provides information regarding the probability (likelihood) of positive outcomes (favorable behavior of
the trustee) and negative outcomes (unfavorable behavior of the trustee) related to the trust decision (Whitmeyer 2000). It has been
argued that risky decisions that require trust are generally based on calculations of the trustee’s costs and benefits of cooperating
versus cheating as evaluated by the trustor (Ba and Pavlou 2001; Dasgupta 1988; Hart and Saunders 1998; Williamson 1993).
Positive and negative ratings are generally used to estimate the likelihood of gaining or losing (i.e., positive ratings are associated
with possible gains), and negative ratings are associated with possible losses. However, losses were generally found to have
greater impact than gains, an asymmetry well known in decision making (Coombs and Lehner 1984). Specifically, prospect theory
states that separate weights are assigned gains and losses, people are more sensitive and averse to loss than gain (Kahneman and
Tversky 1979). Therefore, negative feedback was found to have a greater impact than positive feedback (Johnson et al. 1988;
Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1981; Roese 1997; Wong and Weiner 1981).
However, it has been pointed out in the literature that decision making under risk and uncertainty is not always based on full
calculations of costs and benefits. Rather some simple heuristics are used and people are sensitive to the framing of the
information provided (Tversky and Kahnman 1974). Different reputation systems present reputation ratings in different numerical
formats. For example, reputation systems used by eBay and Yahoo! Auction use the frequency format, while those by
Amazon.com and Yahoo! Shopping use the decimal format. Is a person with 95 positive ratings and 5 negative ratings viewed
the same when his ratings are presented as “95 positive, 5 negative,” “95% positive out of 100 ratings,” or “90 net positive out
of 100 ratings”?
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It is often assumed that a rational decision maker interprets the values under different numerical formats equivalently, sometimes
referred as the numerical equivalence assumption (Cohen et al. 2002). Nevertheless, people do interpret numerical formats
differently, with different numerical formats associated with different abstract representations of amount. The implication that
different representations of a common abstract structure can cause dramatically different cognitive behaviors is sometimes referred
to as representation determinism (Zhang and Norman 1994). Representation determinism implies that the form of external
representations determine what information can be perceived, what processes can be activated, and what structures can be
discovered from the specific representation (Zhang 1997). In fact, it is known that people generally process information in the
fashion related to the way is it displayed (Bettman and Kakkar 1977). This suggests that presenting feedback as the difference
between the number of positive and negative ratings (referred to as the difference format) is unlikely to be evaluated the same
way as presenting feedback as a percentage of positive ratings to the total number of ratings (referred to as the percentage format),
or simply presenting the positive and negative ratings separately (referred to as the separate format). Based on the literature
review, we have the following hypotheses:
H1: Negative ratings have a stronger effect than positive ratings regardless of the presentation format.
The hypothesis implies that an additional negative rating requires more than one positive rating to be compensated. In other words,
person A with 95 positive ratings and 5 negative ratings should always be perceived as less-reputable than person B with 90
positive ratings and 0 negative.
H2: Presentation format moderates the effects of negative ratings on perceived reputation. Negative ratings
have the strongest effect under the separate format, followed by the percentage format, and then the
difference format.
The hypothesis implies that a person with more negative ratings than another person would require a different number of
additional positive ratings under different presentation formats in order to make the two people be perceived as equally reputable.
This can be explained by the fact that negative ratings have stronger effects than positive ratings, and that negative ratings are
the most salient under the separate format, followed by the percentage format and then the difference format.
Experimental Design
This study looks at how different representations of the same piece of information in different formats affect the subjective
evaluation of someone’s reputation. Three representation formats will be evaluated. The first format, referred to as the separate
format, presents overall reputation by simply displaying the number of positive and negative ratings separately. The second
format, referred to as the difference format, presents overall reputation as the difference between the number of positive and
negative ratings, together with the total number of ratings. This format is currently used by Websites such as eBay and Yahoo.
The last format, referred to as the percentage format, presents overall reputation as a percentage of the number of positive ratings
over the total of ratings, together with the total number of ratings. This format is currently used by Websites such as
Download.com.
A one-hour experiment is being conducted with 78 subjects to-date making a series of 40 rounds of decisions based on a situation
commonly used in trust and reputation research (Berg et al. 1995). In each round, the subjects are required to indicate their
preferences between two hypothetical borrowers to which the subjects would lend $1,000 based on the borrowers’ credit ratings
(reputation ratings). The credit ratings of the two borrowers vary across the total number of ratings (50, 100 200, and 400), and
the percentages of negative ratings (0%, 4%, 8%, 16%, and 32%) at each level of total number of ratings. In other words, the 40
rounds consist of 4 levels of total number of ratings, with 10 possible pairs of different ratings at each level, resulting in 40
different pairs of credit ratings. To reduce fatigue, subjects were given a 10 minute break after round 20. Also, the 40 pairs of
credit ratings were assigned to the subjects in random order, with each pair assigned to some subjects in the earlier rounds, and
some subjects in the later rounds.
In each round, the preferences on the two borrowers are elicited using the preference ladder procedure (Gonzalez and Wu 1999).
An example of a preference ladder in provided in Table 1. Each ladder consists of 10 rungs with the credit rating of borrower A
at a particular level of total number of ratings (e.g. 100, plus a small number), and a particular percentage of negative rating (e.g.,
4%). The credit rating of borrower B in rung 1 has a higher percentage of negative ratings (e.g., 16%), but also a higher number
of positive ratings. However, the difference between the positive and negative ratings of borrower A (102 – 4 = 98) is equal to
the difference between the positive and negative ratings of borrower B (114 – 16 = 98) at rung 1. This allows us to evaluate
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whether accounting overall reputation as the difference between positive and negative ratings is a reasonable representation. If
that is the case, the two borrowers should be perceived as equally reputable at rung 1 (i.e., average rating at rung 1 should be 3).
In the following nine rungs, the credit rating of borrower A remains constant, while the credit rating of borrower B improves with
a constant number of positive ratings added.  The preference ladder also allows us to evaluate the representativeness of accounting
overall reputation as the percentage of positive ratings over total ratings. If that is the case, the two borrowers should be perceived
as equally reputable at the rung where the two borrowers have the same reputation ratings in terms of percentage.
Table 1.  Example of Preference Ladder under the Separate Format Condition
Rung
Credit Rating of
Borrower A
Clearly
Prefer
A
Slightly
Prefer
A
About
the
Same
Slightly
Prefer
B
Clearly
Prefer
B
Credit Rating of
Borrower B
1 102 positive
4 negative
X 114 positive
16 negative
2 102 positive
4 negative
X 138 positive
16 negative
3 102 positive
4 negative
X 162 positive
16 negative
4 102 positive
4 negative
X 186 positive
16 negative
5 102 positive
4 negative
X 210 positive
16 negative
6 102 positive
4 negative
X 234 positive
16 negative
7 102 positive
4 negative
X 258 positive
16 negative
8 102 positive
4 negative
X 282 positive
16 negative
9 102 positive
4 negative
X 306 positive
16 negative
10 102 positive
4 negative
X 330 positive
16 negative
Preliminary Results
More analyses will be conducted as more data is collected. Nevertheless, the preliminary results tend to support the hypotheses.
Figure 1 provides an example in which the average ratings of the two borrowers over the 10 rungs when borrower A starts with
2 percent negative rating and borrower B starts with 8 percent  negative ratings. As hypothesized, a negative rating has a stronger
effect than a positive rating. This is demonstrated by the fact that although the difference between the number of positive and
negative ratings is the same for borrower A (102 – 4 = 98) and borrower B (114 – 16 = 98) at rung 1, borrower A is strongly
preferred to borrower B for all three conditions. 
However, the number of additional positive ratings required to make borrower B be perceived as being as reputable as borrower
A is different under different presentation formats.  This is reflected by the different cutoff points at which borrower B and
borrower A are equally preferred. Negative effects have the weakest effect under the difference format, as shown in the figure
that borrower A is equally preferred to borrower B at about rung 6. Under the percentage format, person A is equally preferred
to person B at about rung 7.  In other words, borrower A with 102 positive and 4 negative ratings is perceived as equally reputable
as borrower B with 234 positive and 16 negative ratings when the ratings are presented in the difference format. However,
borrower B would need 258 positive and 16 negative ratings in order to be perceived as equally reputable as borrower A when
the ratings are presented in the percentage format. Under the separate format, borrower B would need 330 positive and 16 negative
ratings.
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Figure 1.  Average Ratings of the Two Borrowers under the Three Presentation Formats
in One of the Preference Ladders
The results suggest that negative ratings have different effects under different presentation formats, which possibly can be
explained by the salience of negative ratings under each format. The effects of negative ratings under different presentation
formats may induce difference in members’ behavior in a virtual community. For example, a member of a virtual community
presenting reputation using the separate format would be less forgivable for his/her negative behavior since a negative rating
requires more additional positive ratings to compensate. As a result, a member may be more conscientious, wanting to avoid
negative ratings such as signing up under a new alias.
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